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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------- --------------------------------

INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 16599

vs.
AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellant.

----------------RESPONDENTS BRIEF

----------------STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Respondent, Interstate Excavating, Inc., brought suit
against appellant for sums due for labor and materials for construetion of sewer and water systems in two subdivisions.

Appellant

Counterclaimed for back-charges.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Third District Court, Judge Jay E. Banks, entered a
default judgment against appellant at trial and dismissed appellant~s
counterclaim.

Appellant's Motion to vacate the judgment was

denied by Judge Banks, after hearing, on June 18, 1979.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order denying its Motion
to vacate the default judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent, Interstate Excavating Inc., commenced an
action against appellant, Agla Development Company on May 16,
1978 after appellant refused to pay for labor and materials
for construction of the water and sewer systems in two subdivision
(Falcon Hurst #1 and Falcon Hurst #2) located in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah.

(R.2-7)

Prior to the action being brought,

respondent, by agreement and in reliance thereon that payment
would be made by appellant, released 66 lots in Falcon Hurst #1
and 55 lots in Falcon Hurst #2, under its materialmans lien.
(R.15-16)
An answer and counterclaim was filed to respondent's
complaint on behalf of appellant by its attorney, Robert J. Haws.
(R.10-14)

A reply was made to the counterclaim.

(R.21-22)

The case was set for trial on May 7, 1979, pursuant to notice
that was served on each of the parties by the Clerk of the Court
by mailing to the respective attorneys.

(R.24)

A pre-trial settle

ment conference was held before Judge Hal G. Taylor on April
16, 1979, pursuant to order and notice from the Clerk of the
Court duly served by mailing on each of the parties.

(R.25-28)

A notice of withdrawal of counsel was filed with the Court on
April 13, 1979, by Robert J. Haws, attorney for the appellant.
(R.27)

At the pre-trial settlement conference, appellant's counsE

requested that he be allowed to withdraw and was granted permission to do so by Judge Taylor.

(R.28)

Respondent's attorney

-2-
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was instructed by Judge Taylor to notify the appellant that his
counsel had withdrawn, to appoint new counsel, and of the trial
setting of May 7, 1979.

(R.28)

Notice was sent to the appellant,

at its business offices the same day of the pre-trial settlement
conference, April 16, 1979, by respondent's attorney, as instructed.

(R.

29)

Respondent appeared at trial on May 7, 1979, prepared to
prove its claims.

Appellant failed to appear at trial, either

by corporate officer or counsel.

A judgment by default was

granted in favor of respondent after evidence was presented
at the request of the Court by respondent in support of its
claims.

The counterclaim of appellant was dismissed with prejudice

on Motion of respondent.

(R.30-34)

A copy of the judgment

and decree of foreclosure was served upon appellant by mailing
to its corporate offices on May 14, 1979.

(R.34)

After receiving a copy of the judgment, appellant obtained
counsel and filed a verified motion to vacate the judgment.
(R.35-36)

The motion of appellant was denied by Judge Banks

at a hearing held thereon, June 18, 1979.

(R.37)

A copy of the

order denying appellant's motion was mailed to Mr. DeLand,
appe 11 ant • s counse 1 on June 18, 1979 and was signed by Judge
Banks on July 6, 1979.

(R.38)

Appellant appealed the order

denying its motion to Vacate the J'udgment by notice of appeal
filed July 19, 1979.

(R. 39)

The statement of appellant, in its brief under "Statement
.al date was received until
of Facts," that "no notice of the trl

-3-
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a copy of the default judgment was received" is not supported
by the facts in this case.

Appellant received two notices of

the trial setting prior to the trial, the first from its
attorney, Mr. Haws, and the second from respondents counsel.
Both the notice of withdrawal of counsel (R.27) and the notice
to appoint counsel (R.29) which were mailed to appellant at its
corporate offices, gave appellant notice of the trial date.

The

receipt of the notice of withdrawal of counsel is not denied by
appellant and the receipt of the notice to appoint counsel
is admitted by Lafe Brown, appellant's President.
ARGUMENT
DENIAL OF APPELLANTS MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT
WAS WITHIN SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
The Motion of appellant to vacate the judgment was made
pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the only provisions of law justifying the setting aside of a
default judgment.

This rule provides relief from a final judgment

for reasons of "mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable
neglect".
It is apparent from the uncontroverted facts, that none of
these grounds exist in the instant

case.

For this reason, the

denial of the motion to vacate the judgment was a proper exercise
of the discretion of the trial Court.
Since Lafe Brown, President of Agla Development, the
appellant, was specifically informed as to his obligation to
appoint counsel, after his counsel had withdrawn, (he having fired
his counsel) and had received at least two notices of the trial

-4-
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date,

(notice of withdrawal of counsel and notice to appoint

counsel) and was given ample time in which to act, there are
no grounds whatsoever to reasonably argue that his failure to
appoint counsel and appear at the scheduled trial was by reason
of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect.

Lafe

Brown, as President of Agla Development, the appellant, had ample
notice to appoint counsel and appear at the scheduled trial
but willingly chose to ignore the notices he received under
the state of the circumstances.
The sole excuse for failing to appoint new counsel and
appearing at the scheduled trial, is the claim that the notice
to appoint counsel was misplaced with numerous pleadings served
upon defendant at its office by mail.

If this constitutes

neglect, it is far from "excusable neglect" since Lafe Brown,
appellant's President, had fired Mr. Haws, was informed of the
trial date and the requirement that he appoint new counsel at
least three weeks prior to the scheduled trial.

Having failed

to take any action to appoint new counsel and appear at the
trial after admittedly receiving notice in ample time to do so,
constitutes willful conduct on the part of the appellant.
conduct cannot constitute "neglect".

Willful

It follows with even greater

force that willful conduct cannot constitute "excusable neglect"·
The claim of Lafe Brown, President of appellant, "that the notice
· ·
of trial was not received until a certificate
o f mai·1·ing of the
judgment of foreclosure, under date of May 14, 1979, was served" '
is clearly not supported by the facts and is contradicted by
-5-
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the verified motion of Mr. Brown.

simil~

The situation involved in the instant case has some
to that involved in Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (1979).

In

that case, the attorney for the defendant, Mower, filed a notice
of withdrawal of counsel with a certification that a copy of the
withdrawal had been sent to the defendants last known address.
Later, an amended notice of withdrawal of counsel was sent to
the defendant after his attorney learned of his current address.
The deputy clerk of the District Court prepared a notice of
pre-trial indicating that pre-trial was set for April 20, 1978.
Copies of this document were sent to defendant's attorney, as
well as the defendant by mailing.

In addition to the notice of

pre-trial sent by the deputy clerk, the plaintiff's attorney mail
a copy of the notice of pre-trial by certified mail to the
defendant which was returned "unclaimed".
for the scheduled pre-trial.

Plaintiff appeared

Defendant, Mower, did not appear an·

was not represented by counsel.

The Court received into evidence

by proffer the notice of pre-trial which had been sent by
certified mail to the defendant and returned "unclaimed" and docu
ments relating to the substantive allegations of the plaintiff's
amended complaint and granted a default judgment in favor of
plaintiff against defendant Mower for fraudulent misrepresentatio
in the amount of $13,225.63 plus costs and interest.

The defenda

contacted an attorney and timely filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment on the basis of "excusable neglect" claiming
that he had never received a notice of pre-trial which was sent
certified mail and returned "unclaimed" and tha_t he became aware
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of the pre-trial hearing through a telephone
his former wife.

·
conversation with
Defendant made no specific mention of whether

he had received the notice of pre-trial mailed by the deputy
clerk of the District Court approximately one month prior to
the scheduled pre-trial and that he did not know of the withdraw!
of his attorney until seven days before the scheduled pre-trial.
The trial Court denied the motion to set aside the default judgment
after finding that defendant knew about the pre-trial date,
that he had received timely notice, and that the withdraw!
of his attorney had taken place months prior to the date of pre-trial.
This Court upheld the action of the trial Court and refused to
set aside the default judgment.

The basis of the decision was

as follows:
"In the case before us, the defendant did not
offer the trial Court a reasonable excuse for
his non-appearance so as to bring him under the
rule that the Court should liberally excersise
their power to set aside default judgments.
Repeated attempts were made by the Court, by
counsel for the adverse party and by Mower's
own attorney to contact him regarding t~e
status of the law suit he knew was pending.
Despite the fact that Mower's fi:st atto:ney
certified that he had sent a notice of withdraw! of counsel to Mower's Washington State
residence on March 2, Mower claimed he did not.
learn of the withdraw! until April 12t~. De~pite
the fact that the District Co~rt Cler~ s office
sent Mower a notice of pre-trial to his
Washington State residence on March 8th and
despite the fact that plainti~f's counse~f. d
mailed a copy of the same notice by certi ie
· t on r es;dence
mail to Mower's Washing
...
, . Mower .
claimed he didn't learn of the pre-trial hearing
until March 18th.
d t's mail-gram nor his
"Moreover, neither def~nh~n motion to set aside
0
affidavit in supper~
i~ offers a full and
the second default JUdgmen
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complete enough explanation for defendant:s
non-appearance sufficient to mandate a trial
Court setting aside the judgment.****Mower
also incorrectly stated in his affidavit that
this mail-gram indicated to the Court "he had
received no notice of the hearing and that he
did not have time to retain another attorney or
to prepare for the hearing". Aside from these
vague and sometimes incorrect statements, Mower's
affidavit does not attempt to explain the reasons
for his failure to appear at the pre-trial hearing".
In the instant case, notice to appoint counsel was sent
directly to Lafe Brown, President of appellant, at the instruction
of Judge Taylor, and clearly states he was to appoint new
counsel to represent defendant in that Mr. Haws had withdrawn
and placed appellant on notice that the case was set for trial
on May 7, 1979 at 10:00 a.m.

Receipt of this notice was

acknowledged by Mr. Brown in his verified motion to vacate the
judgment.

Mr. Haws sent notice on April 12, 1979 directly to

Mr. Brown at the offices of Agla Development of his withdrawal,
which notice also contained notice of the trial date.

The Clerk

of the Court routinely called each of the parties the day before
trial to inform them of the Judge to which the case had been
assigned.

Mr. Brown, having fired his attorney

Mr. Haws, could

not deny that he had notice of the withdrawl of his counsel.

The

Court was not obliged to believe the somewhat questionable
excuse given by Mr. Brown in the verified motion to vacate the
default judgment, that the notice to appoint counsel was misplaced
and that he had no notice of the trial date until May 14, 1979.

{R.35-36)

In view of these facts, the trial Courts conclusion

that Mr. Brown's failure to heed the notices received was his

-8-
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~a

"deliberate choice" does not seem unreasonable.

The conclusion

to the contrary is unreasonable and therefore does not constitute
excusable neglect.

The instant case has a much stronger basis

for denial of the motion to vacate the default judgment under a
claim that notice to appoint counsel was not received or was
misplaced since, unlike the Mower case, the defendant had fired
its attorney, and was clearly placed on notice of the trial
setting and of its obligation to appoint counsel.

That the

failure of the defendant to respond was due to carelessness and
negligence on the part of defendant's President, Mr. Brown.
"Carelessness" is not synonymous with "excusable neglect"
on the basis of which a default judgment may be set aside.
Beyerle Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. Martinez (Arz. 1977) 574 P.2d
853.

In this case the Arizona Court determined the fact that the

Vice-President of the Corporation had been careless in failing
to retain an attorney to file an answer in an action for breech
of lease was not "excusable neglect" on the basis of which a
default judgment could be set aside.

Excusable neglect with

respect to failure to appear for trial involves a situation where
failure to act resulted from circumstances which would cause a
reasonably careful person to neglect his duties, but failure to act
do to carelessness and negligence is not "excusable neglect"
that would entitle one to have a judgment against him set aside.
Watered Down Farms v. Rowe (Colo. 1977) 566 P.2d 710.
If illness is not excusable neglect, Warren v. Dixon Ranch co.
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), certainly carelessness in
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failing to appoint new counsel and appear at trial where due
notice has been given does not constitute excusable neglect.
Moreover, it has been specifically held that a party trying
to set aside a default judgment "must show that he has used
due deligence, and he was prevented from appearing by circumstance
over which he had no control."

(Emphasis added)

tain Inc., v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429,

(1973).

AirKem Intermoun

Where notice of

trial had been communicated to the adverse party in sufficient
time to enable appearance and to defend the action, there is
no claim for excusable neglect.
The question is one presented to the discretion of the
trial Judge, and will be set aside only if there is a clear abuse
discretion.

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,

(Supra); Board of Educatio

of Granite School District v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806
(1963); AirKem Intermountain Inc., v. Parker (supra 1973).

The

facts before the Court give no basis for a finding that the trial
Court abused its discretion in these circumstances.

It is

apparent that the trial Court did not believe the statements
of Lafe Brown as contained in the verified motion to vacate the
default judgment and found that the failure to appoint new
counsel and to appear at trial after adequate notice was given
was carelessness and negligence on appellant's part.
to T.5 line 25)

(T. 4, line 19

Generally, this Court will not substitue its

discretion for that of the trial Court.

The rule that courts

will incline towards granting relief to a party requesting relief
from a final judgment to one who has not had opportunity to
present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial court level,
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and the Supreme Court will not reverse the determination of
the trial Court merely because the motion to vacate the
judgment could have been granted.

AirKem Intermountain Inc.

v. Parker (Supra 1973); Warren v. Dixon Ranch co.

(Supra 1953).

Only where there is a clear abuse of this discretion will the
trial Court be reversed and each case must be determined on
its own facts and circumstances as they appear at the trial
Court level.

Heath v. Mower (Supra 1979).

Respondent has never taken issue with the timeliness
of appellant's motion to vacate the default judgment.

The

argument of appellant on page 7 of its brief that it provided
reasonable grounds for the failure to be present at trial
as constituting "excusable neglect", is not supported by the
facts.

The claim of appellant that notice was never received

of the trial date prior to the trial is clearly contradicted
by the verified affidavit of Mr. Brown, President of appellant,
and the record that was before the trial Court.
The appellant, raises on appeal for the first time,
pursuant to motion to supplement the record, additional
statements by affidavit of Lafe Brown, appellant's President·
Statements which were not before the trial Court and are based
primarily upon information and belief.

Matters that are stated

upon information and belief are not proper matters for affidavits.
Where the statements contained therein are raised for the first
time on appeal,

this court should decline to decide the issue

before the Court on such statements.

Nelson v. Newman, Utah, 583
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P.2d 601 (1978).
CONCLUSION
The issue before the Court is whether the circumstances
surrounding the defendants failure to appoint new counsel and
appear at the scheduled trial constitute excusable neglect.
The record before the trial Court clearly sets forth facts
that appellant was given adequate notice of the trial setting,
both by its attorney, Mr. Haws pursuant to the notice of withdrawa
of counsel and the notice sent by respondents counsel to appoint
new counsel.

Further, the Clerk of the Court notified the

parties the day before trial as to the Judge to which the case
was assigned for trial.

That the notice to appoint counsel and

of the trial setting was in fact received by appellants President,
Mr. Brown, but was put aside, ignored and then claimed to have
been misplaced.

These facts demonstrate that the trial Court

did not abuse its discretion in finding there was no excusable
neglect justifying the setting aside of the default judgment.
DATED this ~day of November, 1979.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

~~~

~~er

Attorney for Respondent
Suite 430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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